Whether or not parallel repetition lowers the error has been a fundamental question in the theory of protocols, with applications in many different areas. It is well known that parallel repetition reduces the error at an exponential rate in interactive proofs and ArthurMerlin games. It seems to have been taken for granted that the same is true in arguments, or other proofs where the soundness only holds with respect to computationally bounded parties.
Introduction
Various notions of interactive protocols [24, 3, 7, 91 have found wide applicability over the last decade. They have turned out to be essential for cryptography but somewhat more surprisingly, they have also been key to complexity theory, in particular to the theory of hardness of approximation problems (see [l] for a survey). For many of these applications, the purpose of the protocol is for a "verifier" to distinguish between a "good" prover making a legitimate claim and a "bad" prover attempting to trick the verifier into accepting incorrectly. An "error bound" or "error probability" for the protocol is a value for which we have a guarantee that any bad prover will be caught except perhaps with probability this value. Many natural constructions of protocols have relatively large error bounds (constant or worse), and most applications require error bounds that are small (less than 1/poly for any polynomial poly.)
To bridge this gap, there are two generic methods of repeating protocols intended to reduce the error: sequential repetition and parallel repetition. Sequential repetition, repeating the protocol several times, beginning the next run after the previous one terminates, reduces error in all important models. It also preserves desirable properties of the original protocol, such as zero-knowledge (see [22, 311). However, this is an expensive solution, in that it increases the number of communication rounds of the protocol, which is undesirable for both practical and theoretical applications.
Parallel repetition was shown to reduce the error probability of Arthur-Merlin games at an exponential rate [3] . (That is, k parallel repetitions of a protocol with error e results in a protocol with error ek for k 5 poly(n).) It can be shown that the same is true for interactive proofs, although a formal proof does not seem to have appeared. Beyond that, parallel repetition is more problematic. In single prover proofs, Goldreich and Krawczyk [ZO] showed that parallel repetition does not preserve zero-knowledge. In multi-prover proof systems, whether or not parallel repetition reduces the error has been the subject of much research (see [14] for a survey). There are examples of protocols for which two parallel repetitions fail to reduce the error at all [13], so a result as strong as for the single prover model does not hold. However, the error can be reduced at an exponential rate depending on the communication complexity of the given protocol [30] , and this is the best possible [17] .
Soon after the appearance of interactive proofs, the notion of arguments (also called computationally convincing protocols) was put forth by [9, lo] . The difference between a "proof" and an "argument" is that the verifier in a proof is protected against false provers of unlimited computational ability, whereas for an argument, the guarantee of protection is that it is computationally infeasible for a bad prover to convince the verifier with high probability. (More precisely, the soundness condition is "computational," holding only for polynomial time provers.) When designing cryptographic protocols it is natural to assume all parties are polynomial time, so this is a realistic model. Typically these computationally convincing protocols are designed based on complexity assumptions, so that the difficulty of convincing the verifier to accept a false claim is related to the difficulty of solving some hard underlying Computational problem, like inverting a one-way function.
Many computationally convincing protocols have been designed, often involving parallel repetition or some variant that preserves zero-knowledge. It seems to have been assumed that, in analogy to the interactive proof case, parallel repetition does reduce the error in computationally convincing protocols. To our knowledge, we are the first to rigorously explore the question of whether this is the case in general.
What we find is somewhat surprising: the number of rounds determines whether or not there is a general parallel reduction. While in three rounds the error does go down as expected, there are four round protocols with no error reduction at all.
Our results
The main result of our paper is that parallel repetition does not always decrease error probabilities. Assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations we first show a protocol for which the error for two parallel repetitions is basically the same as the error of the original protocol. Next we ;show a protocol for which the error for k = poly(n) parallel repetitions is essentially the same as the error of the original protocol.
In the last mentioned construction, the communication complexity of the original protocol depends linearly on k. Thus, these examples still hold out the possibility of a Raz-like [30] result in which the error does decrease but at a rate proportional to the communication complexity. However, we then present evidence that even this is unlikely to hold in the computational setting. We present a protocol for which there is no "black-box" error-reduction theorem, meaning that standard techniques will be unable to show any reduction in error for even an arbitrarily large polynomial number of repetitions. These results exploit the notion and construction of non-malleable encryption schemes of [la] .
We stress that this is independent of any zeroknowledge (ZK) concerns. As we indicated above, it is well known that zero-knowledge is not preserved under parallel repetition [20]. What we are saying is that even the error does not in general go down. These results are somewhat surprising. Computationally convincing proofs have been around for a long time, and there are a large number of protocols in the literature that use parallel repetition or some variant that preserves zero knowledge. Our results say that a claim that these protocols have low error, if true, cannot rely on a general theorem but must be justified by proofs specific to the protocol at hand. For some constant round protocols, rigorous proofs of this sort have been provided [l6, 61. (Note the constructions there are not exactly parallel repetition.) More often, however, either no argument, or sketchy arguments which seem implicitly to assume parallel repetition works in general, are provided.
The example protocols that establish our negative results have four rounds of interaction. This means that for protocols of four or more rounds we cannot expect a general result saying parallel repetition reduces the error. The best we could hope for is that it does for protocols of three or less rounds. To round off our negative results, we prove this matching positive result, showing that for computationally convincing protocols of three or less rounds, parallel repetition reduces the error at about the best rate we could expect: exponentially until it becomes negligible. (We cannot expect the error probability of a computationally sound proof to ever go below negligible, as this typically is as low as we assume the probability of breaking the underlying hard computational problem like factoring.) The proof exploits techniques from [26] .
These results indicate that there is a fundamental difference about computational soundness and the kind of "statistical" soundness that is the property of interactive proofs (whether single or multiple prover ones) as far as composition is concerned. They also indicate one must be careful in ma.king claims about the error of specific computationally sound protocols.
The bigger picture
zero-knowledge arguments, the question of reducing error in computationally sound protocols makes sense whenever one polynomial time party is going to accept or reject the other, or, even more generally, whenever
Although the main motivation c a m e from the area of a party will produce a boolean output. One natural task where this occurs is identification [15] . Suppose that one can show a protocol where an unauthorized player has probability Q of making the verifier accept (whereas an authorized player may know a strategy that is perfect). Here Q is typically non-negligible and if this is to be used for identification, then the probability of success by an unauthorized player should be very small. It is tempting to run several copies of the protocol in parallel and hope that the probability that an unauthorized player succeeds in all of them goes down to the desired level. ' Other examples might include a coin-flipping protocol. If one party can bias the coin in one repetition by only a certain amount, what can we say about the probability that a fixed k-bit string is chosen if the protocol is executed IC times in parallel? This is basically the same question: just view an outcome that corresponds to the target string as an "accept" and the reverse as a "reject".
A closer look
Let us try to give some idea of why error reduction by parallel repetition in computationally sound protocols might be problematic and what are the issues involved.
The which bears a certain relationship to the challenge (the verifier accepts). Since the verifier's messages are independent, this is a direct product question for relations.
One complication is that the prover cannot necessarily compute this relation, since whether the verifier accepts depends not just on the challenge, but on a random tape used to pick the challenge. (For example, the challenge could be a one-way function of the random tape.) This correspondence is the basic idea of the positive results for three round protocols, which uses a modified version of the proof in [26] of a direct product for Boolean functions. Intuitively, the reason this proof could be adapted for three round protocols is that, although we cannot tell whether the actual verifier accepts, we are interested in converting a strategy for the prover in IC parallel runs to one for a single run In using the parallel strategy, we can simulate all but one of the parallel verifiers, picking their random tapes. We can thus use whether the simulated verifiers accept as an indicator for whether the real verifier is likely to accept. If the simulated verifiers are likely to reject, then we back up and re-simulate them using fresh random tapes until most of them accept.
Unfortunately, this breaks down for the four round case. Here, there are two rounds of challenges and two rounds of responses. After the first round of challenges, the single run prover can pick a response that has a non-negligible chance of causing most of the simulated verifiers to accept. However, at this point, the prover must commit herself to the first response, and hence to the simulated verifier's first challenges. Their second challenges could be fixed as functions of their first challenges, so ,in general, if the simulated prover's response is rejected by many of the simulated verifiers there is no way to back up and try again. We formalize this by having the first challenge be an encryption of the second. It is important that this encryption be non-malleable ( [12])2. The resulting protocol looks much like protocols obtained by a general technique to make trusted verifier zero-knowledge protocols truly zero-knowledge.
This abstract
This is an extended abstract that contains only constructions and result statements. Proofs have been omitted due to page limits. A full version of our paper, containing all proofs, can be found as [5] .
The basic protocol is usually cryptographic, but this idea also makes sense in non-traditional situations. For instance, in [29] there is a proposal to use "an automated Turing test" to make sure that a human is requesting to use a resource like an on-line database and for combating junk-mail. The idea is that the user receives as a challenge a question (or task) that is easy for human but where computers have not made much progress (e.g. simple visual or linguistic problems). Since the probability that a computer will succeed in the task is non-negligible, a natural question is whether by repeating several task in parallel one reduces significantly the probability of success of a machine.
Definitions and setup
If f1 , f 2 : A + R are functions defined over some common domain A C ( 0 , l}*, we say that f1 is eventually less than fi, written fi 5 f2, if there is an integer k 21t is interesting to note that while the (single-fold) protocol works due to the non-malleability of the cryptosystem the repeated protocol fails due to the malleability of the protocol itself.
such that fl(X) I f z ( X ) for all X E A with 1x1 2 k . We say that f : A + R is negligible iff 5 ev 1. I 
Computationally sound protocols
TWO-PARTY PROTOCOLS. We consider a very general two party protocol setting. Think of the players as having some common initial context, represented by a binary string A, member of an underlying set A C (0,1}* called the domain. (This X might be, for example, messages from some previous protocol, thus possibly involving other parties, or public keys of these or other players.) The length of A, denoted n, functions as the security parameter. The actual input for the protocol between the two players is a string x, drawn according to some input distribution I , namely z 8 I ( X ) . The first party, called the prover, is trying to convince the second party, called the verifier, of some claim related to z. They exchange messages, and, at the end of the interaction, the verifier either accepts (outputs 1) or rejects (outputs 0). We are mostly interested in the case where the parties run in time polynomial in n. The verifier is fixed in our setting, so that the protocol is fully specified given the strategy of the verifier.
We view a party B (whether prover or verifier) as an interactive algorithm. It takes inputs z, the conversation M I . . . Mi so far, and its random tape R to output the next message, denoted B ( s , Ml . . .Mi; R).
(For simplicity we omit X from the notation. It is assumed all parties always have access to this context.)
In the case of the verifier, the last message is identified with the bit that indicates its decision. We let B,(.; .) = B ( z , a; .) denote B with input fixed to z. COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS. Let A be any interactive algorithm playing the role of the prover. We let Acc(A, V, E ) denote the probability that V accepts in its interaction with A on common input z, the probability being over the coin tosses of both parties, with x fixed. We let Acc(A, V, I , A) denote the probability that V accepts in its interaction with A on common input x where the probability is over x drawn randomly from I ( X ) and the coin tosses of both parties. We are interested in computational soundness, namely the probability that V can be made to accept, by a polynomial time prover, measured as a function of n.
The error probability is given by a function E : A -+ R.
Definition 2.1 Let V be a verifier strategy over a domain A and input distribution I . We say that V has (computational) error probability E ( . ) if for every polynomial time prover P it is the case that Acc(f',V,I,*) < e v E ( . ) .
That is, the probability that a prover can convince V to accept is at most €(A) for long enough A, with how long depending on the prover.
REMARKS. As indicated above, this is a very general
setup in that we allow a context and input distribution. The "arguments" model of [lo, 91 is typically presented in terms of language recognition. That's a special case of our setup. To discusss a proof system or argument for a language L let A := and let I ( X ) simply assign probability one to X and zero to every other string, for each X E A. Then the soundness condition of Definition 2.1 collapses to the standard one.
In particular, this means all our positive results apply to the standard argument model.
In any usage, the protocol must also satisfy a completeness condition. This says that there is a particular, polynomial time prover strategy P that, if provided with some "secret" information associated to the input x, succeeds in making V accept with high probability (for example, with probability 1). This P is called the honest prover. We do not formally make such a condition because the soundness, which is the main object of our study, is an independent property. But it should be understood that meamingful protocols will satisfy some form of completeness. (For example the ones in our negative results do.)
We are not discussing zero-knowledge. This may or may not be a property of our protocols. We are concerned only with soundness error,
Parallel repetition
Parallel repetition means the original protocol (specified by some verifier V ) is repeated independently k times in parallel, where k 5 poly(n). We let V k denote the corresponding verifier, whose strategy consists of running k independent copies of V , and accepting iff V would accept in all sub-protocols. It is important for the meaningfulness of the parallel repetition problem that we deny the verifier any secret information about either the common input x or the context A. See Appendix A.
Black-box amplification
"Black-box" error-reduction (or amplification), as we now discuss it, is a way of proving error-reduction that is interesting for two reasons. First, it yields a strong result, and thus is desirable. 'Second, whenever we can prove error-reduction at all, it appears we can prove black-box error-reduction. Thus it makes sense t o focus on this method. Namely,
given a prover A, for the protocol defined by Vk, such that Acc(A,Vk,z) > e, we construct a prover B , for the protocol defined by V, such that Acc(A,Vk,x) > 6. (This means that if the error probability of the protocol defined by V is at most 6 then that of the protocol defined by Vk is at most E . ) The natural way (it is hard to imagine an alternative) to accomplish this transformation is "black-box." We specify an oracle machine S such that B = S A . Namely, to define B , we need just one strategy which can call A as a subroutine.
One proves amplification by reduction.
Definition 2.2 Let V be a verifier strategy over a do~i i~n A and input distribution I. Suppose ~, 6 :
A +
[O, 11. A (IC, 6, e) black-box prover transform for V is a probabilistic, polynomial time oracle algorithm S such that for any prover A the following is true for all X E A:
We say that V has a (k, 6 , e)-black-box error-reduction procedure if there exists a black-box prover transform for V.
We explain what we mean by providing A to S as an oracle. The manner in which S can call the probabilistic, interactive function A is constrained. When the common input is 2 (a point in the support of I(A)),
algorithm S has oracle access to A,. (It cannot invoke
A on common inputs other than x.) Furthermore it does not directly supply, or even have access to, the random tape to A,. Think of a random tape R for A, as automatically chosen at random and fixed. S can then supply conversation prefixes c and get back
A, (c; R). (Note this means S can "back-up"
A on the same random tape.) Also, S has a special "reset" button: when it hits this, a new random tape R is chosen at random and fixed for A,.
It is important that S is polynomial time, but note that A is not restricted to be polynomial time. Of course in the computational soundness setting we are only interested in the case where A is polynomial time, but it is hard to imagine a natural black-box procedure that differentiates these cases. From the point of view of S , prover A is just an oracle to be invoked (at unit cost per oracle call): the efficiency of A doesn't matter.
Of course, S can only call A a polynomial number of times. Note that our error-reduction theorem for three round protocols (namely Theorem 4.1) indeed presents a black-box prover transform. In fact it is stronger.
Parallel repetition fails in general
In this section we provide our negative results. Proofs of all results and claims here can be found in [5].
Non-malleable encryption
Our constructions exploit non-malleable encryption schemes as defined and constructed in We want a stronger property, namely that she cannot modify C to some different ciphertext C' whose corresponding plaintext is related to the plaintext of C. This is not guaranteed by semantic security (and in fact for many semantically secure cryptosystems it is easy given an encryption of a bit, to create an encryption of the complement bit). But it is guaranteed by non-malleability. We do not provide a formal definition here (see [12] ).
Our first protocol requires only "complement security," meaning it is hard, given an encryption C of a bit b, to come up with an encryption C' of 1 -b. Our second protocol requires "copy security," meaning it is hard, given an encryption C of a bit b, to come up with an encryption C' of b such that C' # C. (Note in either case if C' is not a valid encryption of any bit, then it "counts" as a failure.) Any non-malleable scheme has these two properties. Our third protocol actually uses non-malleability in its strongest form as per [12] . It is shown in 1121 that non-malleable (and hence complement and copy secure) encryption schemes with unique decryptability exist given the existence of trapdoor permutations. Accordingly we assume such a scheme (G,.f,D) is given and let v: { In : n E N } + R be a negligible function that eventually upper bounds the success of any (polynomial time) adversary.
We call this function the securitg of the encryption scheme. See [5] for a more formal development.
Two fold parallel repetition fails
We specify a four round protocol that has error about 1/2, but when repeated twice in parallel the error is still about 1/2, rather than 1/4.
The input to the parties is a public key pk of the above encryption scheme. The prover is claiming that he "knows" the decryption key sk, or, more exactly, that he knows how to decrypt. The verifier V wants to test this. Roughly, the idea is that V sends a ciphertext B e Epk(b) for a random bit b, and the prover must succeed in returning an encryption of the bit b complemented. The ability to do this is viewed as corresponding to the ability to decrypt B. The full specification of the protocol is below.
In specifying the protocol we give the instructions for V and also indicate what kinds of messages the prover is providing. But we specify no particular strategy for the prover: this is irrelevant to the analysis since we are interested only in soundness. The name of the protocol is DD2, standing for "Don't Do twice." I takes In, runs G(ln) to get back (pk,sk), and outputs pk. (Intuitively, this operation is performed by the honest prover who keeps sk. The dishonest prover, who is our concern for the soundness, does not know sk.) Now, for any polynomial time prover P , we can consider the acceptance probability Acc(P, V, I, In).
Protocol
It is easy to see that there is a (polynomial time) strategy for the prover to make V accept with probability 1/2. In
Step (2) Intuitively this is true since in order to win the prover must create C to be an encryption of the complement of b, given B 8 E p k ( b ) , and this is hard if the encryption scheme is complement secure. Indeed, given a prover with probability of success Q, we can turn it into an adversary A that complements and has advantage at least a! -1/2. Now consider DD;, the two-fold parallel repetition of DDz. We claim its error probability is not less than 1/2 (let alone being about 1/4 as one may have wanted).
Claim 3.2
In the protocol consisting of two parallel repetitions of DD2, there is a polynomial time strategy for the prover to make the verifier accept with probability at least 1/2.
Many-fold parallel repetition fails
We now generalize the protocol of the previous section to k repetitions. We show that for any k there exists a protocol DDI, which is a four round protocol that has error probability or about 1/2, but when repeated k times in parallel the error probability does not reduce. As in DD2, the input to the parties is a public key pk of the above encryption scheme. The prover is claiming that he know^" the decryption key sk, or, more exactly, that he knows how to decrypt.
Protocol DDI, Common input: pk
To complete the protocol specification we still have to ask questions like: where does the key pk come from? Formally, we fit the protocol into the frame- However, we can also claim that if protocol DDk is repeated k times in parallel the error probability does not reduce significantly:
In the protocol consisting of k parallel repetitions of DDk, there is a polynomial time strategy for the prover to make the verifier accept with probability a t least 1/2.
Failure of parallel error reduction
In light of the results of Raz [30] and Feige and Verbitsky [17] a reasonable conjecture at this point is that the failure of error-reduction in protocol DDI, is due to the fact that the communication complexity is proportional to k (the number times we are going to execute the protocol in parallel). In other words, the above results still leave open the possibility that for any protocol there is a value a > 0 such that if the protocol is repeated IC times in parallel, then the probability of failure in all IC execution is adk, for sufficiently large IC (the value of a is determined by the amount of communication in the protocol). This is the case with two-prover proof systems. However, we now give strong indication that for computationally sound protocols even this is not the case. We show (assuming non-malleable cryptosystems exist) that there is no general black-box errorreduction procedure, where black-box means that one does not look inside computation of the players, but can just execute them and watch their behavior, as defined in Definition 2.2. We do this by presenting a particular protocol LC ( "low communication") for which we can prove (assuming non-malleable cryptosystems exist) that there is no black-box error-reduction procedure.
The common input in protocol LC consists of a pair (pk,, pk,) of public keys drawn independently at ran- Theorem 3.5 clearly follows from Claim 3.6 below, which says that there is a prover strategy F for LCk which succeeds in convincing V k with probability about 1/3, no matter how large is k. However, given this strategy as an oracle, there is no way to convince the original verifier with probability significantly more than 1/3. The prover F will not be polynomial time. But that's permitted by Definition 2.2 and we explained there the rationale for this decision. In fact we show something stronger. We will now define a certain "oracle" opk,,pk,(') and make some claims about the protocol when parties have access to this oracle. From this we will deduce Claim 3.6. The oracle is, intuitively, like a prover for LCm. (For our purposes it suffices to set m = IC -1.) It has two "stages," and maintains state between invocations of the two stages. In the first stage it takes as input m ciphertexts C1, . . . , Cm under key pk, . Pick s at random and return C = 8pkz (5; s). Store a "context" for this invocation, including the information x, s.
Having been invoked on Cl,. . . , C, and having returned C as above, the oracle can be invoked for a continuation of the interaction. Here, it is fed Note that U is not computable in polynomial time, since (in its first stage) it decrypts, without having access to the decryption key. Also 0 it is not an "oracle" in the traditional sense since it maintains state between invocations. Since U is just a tool in proving Claim 3.6 this doesn't matter much, but in any case we note that this state can be eliminated by specifying s as FK ((Cl, . . . , C,)) where F is a pseudorandom function family [19] and the key K is chosen at random and made a part of the description of U .
We first claim that given access to this oracle, it is possible to make the verifier V' of LCk accept 1/3 of the time. On the other hand, the non-malleability of the underlying cryptosystem is strong enough to ensure that access to this oracle does not help a polynomial time prover to convince the verifier of the original protocol with probability significantly above 1/3. This is (clearly) a consequence of the following: Proof of Claim 3.6: Just set F to the prover Mopk13pk2 where M is as in Claim 3.7. The latter claim implies part (1) of Claim 3.6. Now we argue part (2) of Claim 3.6. We said above that (as a consequence of Claim 3.8), oracle access to Opk,,pk, won't help a polynomial time prover convince the verifier of LC with probability significantly above 1/3. Then oracle access to F certainly won't help do it, since F can be implemented in polynomial time with access to o p k , ,pk, . I 
Extensions
We could use non-malleable bit commitment instead of non-malleable encryption in some of these protocols to get the same result. This might lead to reducing the complexity assumptions under which the result is obtained. However, the current protocol is more natural. Also using the currently best known schemes for bit commitment would have increased the number of rounds of the protocols.
We can get similar results for protocols for proving membership in an N P language, like this. Let L be any such language. Let the input be z,y where y is an input for one of the above protocols. (That is, a public key for a non-malleable encryption scheme in the first two protocols, and two such\ keys for the second.) The domain is A = x { 1" : n > 1 } and the input distribution puts on y the probability as needed by our protocols above. Run some standard argument protocol on input x and then (after this protocol has completed) run one of our protocols on input y. Accept iff both sub-protocols accept. This protocol is a proof of membership in L but the error does not reduce under parallel repetition.
Positive results
In this section, we show that parallel repetition does indeed decrease error probabilities for any three pass protocol where the verifier has no secret input. The technique used is based on the XOR Casino game of [26]. The proofs of the following results are in [5] . Let V be a verifier defining a three message protocol. Thus V's output is either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject). Say v's random tape is of length T . Let k be a positive integer, The following theorem states a very general error-decreasing property for three-round protocols. We let Comm (A, B , . ) be the communication complexity of the interaction between parties A, B on an input x. Here S requires only oracle access to P*. But in fact S does not depend on V either, in the sense that oracle access to V will suffice too. A consequence of this is: Corollary 4.2 Let V be a three round verifier strategy over a domain A and input distribution I , and let k = k(n) beO(1ogn). ThenV hasa(k,e,l-S)-blackbox error-reduction procedure for any E, 6: A -+ (0,l) satisfying E > (32/6) . e-6zk/128.
In terms of error probabilities, this implies the error decreases at an exponential rate: Corollary 4.3 Let V be a three round verifier strategy over a domain A and input distribution I with error probability 1 -6, and let IC = k ( n ) be O(1ogn). Then V k has errorprobabilityc where€(-) = (32/6(.)).
.--6(.)'k/128
Note the error goes down at an exponential rate but only to l/poly(n). Since the running time of S in Theorem 4.1 is a polynomial in 1 /~, and this running time must stay polynomial, we can only allow k to go as low as O(logn), which means E is l/poly(n).
Open problems and on-going work
Can one show a positive result (ie. that parallel repetition reduces the error) for Arthur-Merlin games of more than three rounds? As a first step one might consider any constant number of rounds, and then more.
Our results are about soundness. What about proofs of knowledge [4] ? Bellare, Halevi and Naor are investigating this question. By using the protocols here they have similar negative results for proofs of knowledge.
